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Markets, networks and the quest for coordination. The 
story of Solimed Enterprise Health 
 
Laura K. Schang1 
 
SETTING THE STAGE. 
Over the past decade, the international and national health policy community has 
increasingly highlighted a quest for coordination in health care. The OECD 
identified coordination deficits between health care disciplines and sectors as a 
key cause of the quality and efficiency problems faced by many health systems, 
and proposed integrated care as a remedy for the perceived lack of coordination 
(Hofmarcher et al., 2007). At national level in Germany, integrated care is 
praised as a structural innovation for better coordination in the best interest of 
patients, providers, payers and the public (SVR, 20092). Over the past decade, 
German health policy has intensely tried to stimulate integrated care at local 
level, in order to enhance coordination and, thus, quality and efficiency of care. 
In other words, coordination is presented as the holy grail of health care. 
In this context, integrated care is usually framed as part of a broader 
paradigm shift – from corporatist to allegedly more effective and efficient market 
structures, from the physician to the physician as entrepreneur and manager, 
                                                   
1 I am very grateful to my six interview partners from Solimed Enterprise Health (two office-based 
physicians, a hospital manager, a hospital medical director), from AOK Rheinland/Hamburg, and 
from Kassenärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein. They kindly invested their time to talk with me about 
their work, their experiences, and their perspectives and I offer my view of Solimed Enterprise 
Health in return. 
2 This Advisory Council is an interdisciplinary expert committee appointed by the Federal Ministry 
of Health to compile advice on the current status of health services and future potential for 
development. 
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from fragmented to integrated care (Lisac et al., 2008; Amelung, 2009). 
Integrated care has, thereby, become an acknowledged vision of health policy 
reforms. However, integration is easier said than done. In fact, many studies 
show how difficult inter-organisational coordination actually is (Axelsson & 
Axelsson, 2006; Amelung et al, 2008; Weatherly et al, 2007; Durose & 
Rummery, 2006; Davies, 2007). 
In this study, I will provide an insight into the mechanisms that play a role 
in realizing integrated care in practice. To that purpose, I reconstruct the 
development of Solimed Enterprise Health, an interdisciplinary and cross-
sectoral  enterprise  in  the  German  city  of  Solingen.  Solimed  is  one  of  the  few  
cases recognized as successful integration of care. In 2009, Solimed members 
received the Innovation Prize of the regional association of statutory health 
insurance physicians, because they “implemented and live the vision of 
integrated care as in only few other places in Germany” (KV, 2009: p.2, 
translation). Moreover, Solimed made the second place of the Northrhine-
Westphalian health prize. The Minister of Health appreciated networking among 
Solimed members as “exemplary and in the best interest of patients” (MAGS, 
2009: p.1, translation). The 75 Solimed physicians were praised for investing 
€700,000 in total into a common software package to exchange information, and 
for establishing pathways to coordinate treatment across disciplines and sectors. 
As proactive entrepreneurs, Solimed members had seized the opportunity created 
by recent health reforms, and had concluded integrated care-contracts with 
sickness funds (Auschra, 2008).  
However, in order to gain insight into the strategies that made Solimed a 
success, one needs to look beyond these success stories and these words of praise 
representing the front stage of innovation, and to take a look backstage. It was 
Goffman (1959) who introduced the metaphors front- and backstage as part of 
his dramaturgical sociology. He proposed that human identities are constructed 
in interaction with others, and that to understand the development of selves, we 
have to look beyond the presentation of the self front-stage where it will align 
with various conventions, and to study the self backstage, where quite other ideas 
might be articulated. Thus, to study the development of Solimed as an example 
of successful integration of care, one should not rely on the front-stage 
representation of Solimed, but study the backstage.  
The front-stage of innovation, that is Solimed standing in the limelight of 
two innovation prizes, easily implies that governance by market mechanisms has 
enabled integration of care. Implicitly Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand of the 
market’ is ascribed much power in realizing integrated care. After all, Solimed is 
called an enterprise. But innovation prizes tend to strip a case of its context and 
focus on what has been achieved, not on how it has been achieved. This how- 
dimension is essential to enable learning processes in other regions and other 
countries. Arguably, the strategies for governing the struggles of integrating care 
can best be identified when analyzing the process, not the product of innovation. 
Therefore, this story does not primarily focus on the product – integrated care – 
but on the process of integrating care. How did Solimed members build their 
Enterprise Health?  
To understand the case of Solimed, I went behind the curtain and talked to 
six actors backstage. Based on the analysis of their accounts, and complemented 
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through analysis of web-pages, newspaper articles and documents, I hereby 
present my account of how Solimed Enterprise Health evolved. The story 
unfolds in four stages – the initial network, the enterprise, the enterprise in a 
health care market and, finally, embedding the local case in a health system 
context. Behind the limelight of two innovation prizes, the story will reveal 
whether it really was Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand of the market’ that did the 
work.  
 
FROM LONE WARRIORS TO A SENSE OF WE    
Networks  are  usually  portrayed  as  a  rather  loose  set  of  linkages  between  
independent actors who develop a shared goal (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1991). In 
Solingen, the emergence and increasing dynamic of a network among 
ambulatory physicians represents a first stage of integrating care. We zoom in 
and listen to the medical director of a hospital who was – at that time – still an 
external observer.  
 
“Do you know the history of Solimed? It all started with an association, 
where a hard core of office-based colleagues came together. In order to 
think about: what could we do as an association to improve 
communication? Then – and I consider this a great achievement! – they 
managed to involve half of all office-based physicians in Solingen in the 
association. Really, that you don´t only fight your way and muddle 
through as a lone warrior, but think about: what could we improve?”  
 
In 2004, a hard core of 28 of the 220 office-based physicians in Solingen 
founded an interdisciplinary practice network called Solimed medical quality 
network: Solimed being  a  play  on  the  words  Solingen and solidarity, and 
medicine. Open to all office-based physicians in Solingen, the network grew 
rapidly and in 2010 it included 145 office-based specialists and general 
practitioners.  
Why did office-based physicians, who were perceived as lone warriors, 
that is, as heterogeneous individuals valuing their independence and autonomy, 
suddenly decide to team up? The medical director explains this shift with a 
perceived need to improve communication. Indeed, the physicians state better 
communication as their first goal in the association statute. In particular, they 
aim at:  
 
“improvement of communication among participating practices with the 
medium-term goal to implement this on an IT-steered basis: development 
and implementation of standards on the communication around the 
patient. The association establishes communication guidelines 
(IT/fax/accompanying letter) whose adherence/compliance is 
mandatory.”  
 
However, they present many more goals – and thereby driving forces – for the 
association, including the: 
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 “improvement of medical quality by developing quality standards 
through internal treatment guidelines; the creation of a basis for further 
projects e.g. integrated care; external representation of the association, 
public relations, maybe development of internet presentation; measures 
for health promotion and prevention.”  
 
Improving internal and external communication, promoting health and medical 
quality,  establishing  a  basis  for  further  projects  such  as  integrated  care  –  the  
network statute comprises ambitious goals. More importantly, the goals were 
turned into action. In 2005, the physicians created a template for a patient-
accompanying letter with information on diagnoses, findings, allergies and 
medication for internal communication. For each referral of a chronically ill 
patient, a network physician would be required to fill out the template and 
directly fax it to the physician of referral. Every practice was obliged to ensure 
availability of a fax for this purpose (Solimed, 2005). In 2006, treatment 
guidelines for eight common conditions such as cough and dizziness were 
established. 
Gradually, the network physicians widened their scope of engagement. 
Three notable examples are a Health Academy (Gesundheitsakademie), the 
Medi-Mobil and transition agreements with local hospitals. The Health Academy 
was founded in cooperation with the local adult education centre. Solimed 
physicians started to organize monthly information sessions on prevention and 
treatment methods free to all citizens – a health literacy initiative for the general 
public that clearly goes beyond traditional curative medicine. Moreover, 20 
Solimed physicians engaged in a street medicine initiative. They committed 
themselves to driving regularly to known places of homeless people with a Medi-
Mobil. The idea is to actively bring health care to those not able, or not willing to 
attend physician practices, and, similar to the Health Academy, it is also a 
cooperation project (here with the Wuppertaler Tafel, an organisation for people 
in poverty).  
Closely observed in local newspapers, the network developed several 
branches. This story will follow only one of them, namely the process of 
integrating care. Before turning to the transition agreements with local hospitals, 
which were important milestones in this process, let us cast a short glance at the 
idea of integration. Essentially, one can conceive of a continuum ranging from 
communication – or information exchange – via coordination to integration. 
Thus, communication forms the backbone of effective coordination and finally 
of integration (Hill, 2009). At this stage, we look at a network of still rather 
independent physicians who had recognized a certain need to improve 
communication, but who were already aiming at more elaborate integrated care 
as stated in the network statute. This goal did not emerge out of the blue – 
indeed, health policy reforms in 2004 had created several incentives for 
concluding integrated care-contracts. We have not yet reached the contractual 
stage of development, but the process of integrating care had already started. 
Integration of care started at an interdisciplinary level, among office-
based GPs and specialists, with internal communication standards such as the 
patient-accompanying letter. Soon, the networking physicians proceeded to the 
cross-sectoral level by concluding transition agreements with hospitals as 
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external partners. Through adjusting and standardizing hospitalization and 
dismissal, these transition agreements were meant to smoothen patients’ 
transitions between hospital and ambulatory sectors. Moreover, the transition 
agreements apparently served as an important catalyst for further integration of 
care. This was not primarily because they created some experience for later, 
more elaborate patient pathways, but rather because the physicians discovered 
the strength and potential of their consensus-driven network. A physician 
explains:    
 
“You need to consider, since 2004 we work together as a network, as an 
association, simple registered association, and we realized that if we 
agree we have relatively many opportunities. We have moved a lot here. 
For example that we could, say, make clear to the hospitals how we want 
patients discharged and how not. In former times we had incidents when 
we wanted to make arrangements with certain people, they said: ‘Well, 
you say that, but the next person says differently!’. We created a uniform 
structure with the association – after all with half of all physicians in 
Solingen. Then we said: Half of all want it this way. Then we realized that 
if we agree we can achieve much.”  
 
Previous to the transition agreements, dozens of single office-based physicians 
had independently struggled as lone warriors to convince hospital physicians 
how to discharge patients and how not. In turn, hospital physicians had blocked 
and refused to cooperate in view of the multiple and contradictory voices: ‘Well, 
you say that, but the next person says differently!’. The physicians participating 
in  the  association  –  half  of  all  office-based physicians  in  Solingen –  then  used  
their network structure to channel divergent voices, and to coordinate their 
actions.  
Having achieved consensus among themselves, they became aware of the 
range of opportunities now open to them. In the active effort to grasp some of 
these opportunities – such as better coordination of patients’ cross-sectoral 
transitions – the physicians realized that their consensus resulted in real changes. 
They managed to develop a structured mechanism for hospital discharges, and 
succeeded in concluding agreements with the hospitals. Thus, the network started 
to mean not only future opportunities, but also factual achievements. Office 
based physicians started to express a we-spirit, consensus acted as a catalyst and 
once things began to move, they developed intrinsic motivation to go further. 
The physician adds:  
 
“…  And then we thought about what else we could do. We thought let´s 
do a full supply chain model. Then we have put money onto the table. 
What was even worse than the money was the loads of work.”  
 
The above quotation conveys an essential pull factor for further 
integration of care: motivation derived from joint successes. Star and Griesemer 
(1987) introduced the notion of ‘boundary objects’ to identify factors which hold 
diverse actors together, and, thereby, enable joint working. Was intrinsic 
motivation the only reason, or ‘boundary object’, why the physicians put money 
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onto the table and shouldered ‘loads of work’? Before exploring how exactly the 
physicians approached a full supply chain model, let us turn to another essential 
‘boundary object’ – here a push factor – for further joint action and integration of 
care.  
 
“Previously we had used the patient-accompanying letter, that would 
have been sufficient in my eyes. But this lives from being used for 
chronically ill patients, for whom there are important details. And 
experience says: ‘Now it´s stressful, I don´t have time for this’ and then it 
doesn´t work. Exchange of these letters was too low. Then we thought 
about: how could we make that work better? The best solution is 
obviously that the physician doesn´t have to do anything, that the software 
automatizes everything.”   
 
To recall, in 2005, the patient-accompanying letter had been introduced to 
improve information exchange – and hence communication and coordination – 
among physicians. However, in practice this innovative idea proved to be 
ineffective. Giving information means taking time, and this appeared to be 
particularly true for the patient-accompanying letter. Written manually, the letter 
often caused delays in daily practice. Because of these delays, many physicians 
were not willing to communicate patient information to their colleagues via 
paper-based letters, even though better information exchange was desirable. How 
did the physicians deal with this challenge?  
One  essential  feature  of  any  network  is  to  deal  with  –  or  govern  –  
challenges in a way most convenient to the network members. In a hierarchical 
organization, non-compliance with the rule to use patient-accompanying letters 
could have resulted in formal sanctions for the deviant. Whether such 
punishments would have been effective in ensuring careful communication is, 
obviously, another question. In contrast, a network cannot afford to ‘scare off’ its 
members. Networks are inherently characterized by trust and reciprocity (Knoke 
& Kuklinski, 1991). Sanctions and punishments would have probably 
undermined trust, simply because members were not willing to invest time into 
writing letters – time that delays treatment of other patients – and, thereby, 
disrupted the network.  
Refraining from any action is also a way to govern challenges (Hill, 
2009). Accepting fate, the physicians could have simply abolished their ideas of 
better information exchange. However, instead of stepping back, they decided to 
step forwards. They decided to switch from paper-based to software-driven 
communication so that the individual physicians would be relieved from 
bureaucracy. The physicians recognized that automatization would be the best 
solution to genuinely living information exchange. Interestingly, their association 
statute from 2004 already included the medium-term goal of a common IT-
platform. In that view, the idea of electronic integration did not emerge out of the 
blue.  
Let us now return to the story of the full supply chain model, sometimes 
also called the integrated delivery system. This model is rooted in the managed 
care tradition, and is intended to improve quality and efficiency of care (SVR, 
2009). Indeed, this model has been defined as a vision of integrated care, because 
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it integrates three dimensions of integration: medical, functional and 
technological integration (Amelung, 2009). What do these dimensions imply? 
Medical integration refers to coordination of all relevant providers across the 
entire chain of care, to enable ‘seamless’ provision of health services. Functional 
integration comprises the integration of non-medical services, such as strategic 
management, controlling and financing. Finally, electronic integration refers to 
the integration of information systems in order to facilitate medical and 
functional integration (ibid.).  
Medical, functional and electronic integration obviously do not develop 
overnight, without any effort. Only a hard core of all physicians in Solingen had 
formed the initial network and, again, only a hard core of network physicians 
were willing to invest further efforts. Between 70 and 80 physicians crystallized 
out of the existing network. In spring 2007, they started to meet weekly to 
discuss ways of electronic integration, as a first step. Interestingly, despite 
general consensus on implementing electronic integration, there was heated 
debate on how to achieve this:  
 
“The group nearly became divided, because there were two approaches. 
One side wanted a completely joint software, the others wanted a reduced 
version. They wanted to keep their own software, and only establish 
small-scale integration on top … there was much interaction in the 
group.”  
 
At this point we witness another governance challenge: The networking 
physicians had seen their strength in their consensus, based on the idea that if we 
agree we can achieve much. Now they were confronted with critical 
disagreement. Indeed, other practice networks in Germany had already become 
shipwrecked on the critical reefs of how to integrate their information systems. 
How did the physicians in Solingen proceed? 
 
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE NETWORK:  
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AS BOUNDARY OBJECTS  
The physicians did not reconcile all interests. After two months of discussion, 
they decided by majority vote. And the majority voted for completely new, joint 
software. At this point, we have reached another stage of development, because 
the decision for a new software package transformed the idealistic network 
structure into a materialistic one. Now trust came to be materially embedded. 
The notion of the boundary-object, introduced by Star and Griesemer (1987), 
points to the power of specific material objects to connect different stakeholders 
by enabling a certain standardization without erasing the differences: a museum 
can be considered a boundary object for different kinds of art as they are 
exhibited in a similar manner while preserving their diversity. Star and 
Griesemer specifically pointed to the function of information infrastructures as 
boundary objects, and this is the sort of boundary object that plays an important 
role in institutionalizing Solimed Enterprise Health. 
To implement the decision to buy a new software package, the physicians 
founded the limited liability company Solimed Enterprise Health. This company 
set the legal frame for a full supply chain model. In contrast to a simple network 
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or association, a company would be able to contract with sickness funds, and, 
thereby, mobilize requisite funds for a full supply chain model. But Solimed 
Enterprise Health would only be able to contract once its internal structures were 
adequately developed. Internal structures were, first of all, electronic integration 
with all members. Thus, the physicians made the switch to common software a 
precondition for joining Enterprise Health. Of the 70 to 80 physicians involved 
in the debates, 60 physicians agreed to buy new software to become a member of 
Enterprise Health. Some of them, though, perceived this switch as a bitter pill:  
 
“The bitter pill that all had to swallow with Enterprise Health was the 
electronic integration. The software in our practice worked well. Actually 
we had a much better system which we liked much more than the network 
solution. Thus we had to abandon our quite excellent software in favour 
of the network software. For us that was a really bitter pill in the 
beginning, not only in financial terms. The practices had to put 15,000-
20,000 Euro onto the table, depending on the number of workplaces. But 
our own former software had worked great, with text modules tailored to 
the practice. That was the bitter pill many colleagues didn´t want to take. 
The financial barrier and, second, I like my own software much better.”   
 
Above, we face a remarkable paradox of innovation. An essential ‘push factor’ 
for electronic integration was that information exchange via patient-
accompanying letters was laborious, time-consuming, and thereby caused delays 
in daily practice. Electronic integration was expected to save time and facilitate 
communication. But electronic integration was not a magic bullet.  The 
innovation had negative side-effects, namely costs in both financial and 
administrative terms. 
These negative side-effects deterred many physicians from changing their 
software. Nevertheless, we observe that 60 physicians decided to become 
members of Solimed Enterprise Health, and to install the new software. This 
number may seem low, as it  equals only half of the Solimed network members, 
and only one quarter of all office-based physicians in Solingen. But the number 
is surprisingly high in view of the high financial and administrative costs 
incurred. How can we understand this?   
Besides the we-spirit derived from joint successes in the network, at a 
more technical level, the ineffectiveness of the patient-accompanying letter 
fostered further action. But there are often different layers of context that 
underlie action (Hinds et al, 1992). Indeed, the idea of founding Enterprise 
Health is also embedded in a wider context, or background, as a physician 
recounts: 
 
“Joining Solimed happened, for the single practice, against the 
background to assert yourself in the market. As one single practice, we 
were concerned whether we would still exist in ten years – or whether 
there would only be ‘Medizinische Versorgungszentren’. That was our 
motivation to join Solimed Enterprise Health.” 
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Medizinische Versorgungszentren (MVZs, medical treatment centres) were 
introduced in 2004 – the year when Solimed medical quality network was 
founded – and are promoted by the Federal Government as an innovative model 
to improve quality and efficiency of care (BR, 2009). Physicians from several 
disciplines work as salaried employees, usually under one roof to create 
organizational synergies and facilitate coordination. Notably, MVZs can be run 
by hospitals. Thus, they are an opportunity for hospitals to engage in ambulatory 
care (Amelung et al, 2008). At local level in Solingen, MVZs were apparently 
perceived as a threat to the independent practice. The physician-led Solimed 
Enterprise Health was an explicit counter-proposal in this context. 
The Solimed physicians pro-actively approached the three hospitals in 
Solingen. They managed to involve all of them in the Enterprise Health as 
partners; not as potentates: In the shareholders’ meeting each hospital counts as 
one member, and the general rule is ‘one member, one vote’. While the two 
larger hospitals, nevertheless, each hold three votes, their voting power remains 
limited, in view of the 75 office-based physicians involved. Thus, Solimed 
Enterprise Health has clearly been organized as a physician-led company, 
related to concerns that hospitals might otherwise monopolise the shareholders’ 
meeting. But why did the hospitals join this physician-led Enterprise? A hospital 
manager explains the rationale: 
 
“An important issue for us was certainly to strengthen the referrer 
bindings. Large hospital chains follow a different strategy. They just buy 
ambulatory practices and thereby generate their own referrers. But here, 
we want to come to arrangements based on trust. And peu à peu, we did 
succeed.”  
 
Traditionally, the relationship between hospitals and office-based physicians in 
Germany has been characterized by a certain dependence of the former on the 
latter. Ultimately, hospital activity depends on referrals from the ambulatory 
sector. Recent health policy reforms, notably the introduction of MVZs in 2004, 
however, shifted the balance to a certain extent. Hospitals, and in particular large 
hospital chains, can and do buy ambulatory practices and employ their own 
referrers. The hospitals in Solingen chose differently. A hospital manager 
emphasizes the value of trust in this context. It seems that Solingen was a special 
case. 
Arguably, office-based physicians in Solingen were more active than in 
other regions; already in 2004 they had been networking, and Enterprise Health 
was created on their initiative. The hospitals joined the company immediately, 
but after some basic decisions such as the legal structure and the method of 
electronic integration had already been taken by the physicians. Hospitals in 
Solingen were thus not the initial change agents. They sensed how networking in 
the ambulatory sector gathered momentum, and decided to support this 
development. Besides the economic rationale for cooperation – namely better 
bonding with office-based physicians to generate sufficient referrals – the 
hospitals seem to have been well aware of their mutual dependence on 
information, the backbone of effective coordination. A hospital medical director, 
whose position had now changed from an external observer to an internal 
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partner, depicts this interdependence between ambulatory and hospital sectors as 
follows: 
 
“In former times, hospital discharges were often Friday afternoon. That 
worked well when the operation was on Monday. But then the patient 
stood before closed doors of the office-based colleague, for example to 
get a prescription. Thus we developed a system of previous 
announcements to let the physician know: ‘I still need to arrange a 
nursing service’. And this with rapid communication, not – as it is still 
widespread –  on a hand-written note which not everyone can read. We 
don´t send the letter by post anymore, but through the software and the 
letter arrives immediately. The office-based physician knows what to 
expect. In turn, of course, we also need anamnestic data, when the patient 
comes to us. We ask for medication and the patient says ‘that small white 
pill, Doc, you know …’. We need much information which the patient 
often cannot give to us; on X-ray images, laboratory findings etc. Thus, 
we arranged that we can view the findings for every patient immediately.”  
 
While office-based physicians depend on information from the hospitals, such as 
dates of hospital discharge or continuing care needs of patients, hospitals, in turn, 
require also a range of details about referred patients. This cross-sectoral 
interdependence on information had already been acknowledged in 2006, as 
mentioned previously, when the hospitals and Solimed medical quality network 
had concluded transition agreements to smoothen patients’ transitions between 
the sectors. However, as the hospital medical director illustrates, the 
effectiveness of paper-based letters for information exchange is limited by, for 
example, the time lag between sending and receiving. Electronic integration, by 
contrast, enables viewing essential patient data immediately. Updated from 
paper-based to electronic means, communication between ambulatory and 
hospital sectors is now perceived as more rapid and effective. 
However important, electronic integration only constitutes a technical 
tool. To realize a full supply chain model, Solimed members also engaged in 
what has been called medical integration (cf. Amelung, 2009): They started 
developing standardized treatment pathways to coordinate patient care across 
sectors. The treatment guidelines created in 2006 by the Solimed medical quality 
network had been rather basic, covering only ambulatory disciplines. The 
envisaged treatment pathways, contrastively, are supposed to accurately define 
across sectors who does what, when, how, and in which timeframe. Agreeing 
upon such complex pathways requires thorough discussion and negotiation, both 
between the disciplines and the sectors involved. The Enterprise Health 
members tackle this challenge by creating small working groups. In order to 
represent all relevant groups, each group comprises at least one general 
practitioner, one office-based specialist, and one hospital chief physician. 
Moreover, each group focuses on a specific condition. Based on existing 
guidelines of the medical societies, treatment pathways were and are developed 
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for major conditions such as diabetes and stroke.3 But the process of agreeing on 
common standards can be a struggle, as a physician notes: 
 
“Well, in these working groups there is the dancer, who wants to show 
off; another one is exceedingly talkative; other people may have a hidden 
agenda –strange contracts with pharmaceutical companies; there can be 
many connections. Bringing this down to a purely objective level: ‘what is 
evidence-based’? ‘What is quality’? That is very time-consuming. And if 
some people are destructive in their communication, or tend to blabber, 
such a group can also fail.”  
 
The physician alludes to several challenges surrounding standardization. On the 
one hand, working groups for developing standards face similar struggles as any 
other group: Groups rarely constitute a unified block; there can be dancers, 
gossip-mongers, those with a hidden agenda. Converging these different interests 
and characteristics of group members towards a common goal is a general 
challenge for groups. On the other hand, standardization is a particularly delicate 
process. Professionals tend to perceive standards as limits to their professional 
autonomy, and if they agree on the need for standards, they often disagree on the 
relevant criteria for these standards (Hill, 2009). Solimed members had decided 
to take scientific evidence as their basic criterion – in contrast to personal 
preferences, for example – but determining what constitutes evidence, quality 
and objective facts is not self-evident and, therefore, another challenge. With 
regard to governance strategies, how were these challenges addressed? This 
question takes us to the dimension of functional integration of decision-making 
processes.  
Taking the development of treatment pathways as an example, decision-
making processes unfold in two main stages. First, Solimed members chose to 
delegate the development of treatment pathways to small working groups. This 
means that neither a single individual devises the pathways (not only time-
consuming, but also with certain dictatorial appeal), nor do the Solimed group as 
a whole design the pathways (very democratic, but most likely rather ineffective 
in view of the multiplicity of voices involved). The choice of small working 
groups, with balanced representation of the main stakeholders, reflects thus the 
choice of a middle way. In order to ensure timely results, the functioning of the 
working group is embedded in internal rules of procedure. For example, each 
working group has a deadline to deliver. Having passed the deadline without 
deliverables, the group can be dissolved, and a new group be created. How can 
such internal rules of procedure foster effective communication? Rules stand 
above personal preferences of individuals and, thereby, evoke a hierarchical 
mode of governance. Governing by rules means that deviants face sanctions. 
These sanctions are not necessarily financial; social aspects such as saving face 
in front of peers can create a very effective pressure to meet the deadline. 
As soon as a working group has delivered, the second stage of decision-
making unfolds. Drafts of the pathways are presented to all shareholders, that is, 
                                                   
3 Some treatment pathways have already been implemented, others are in development. 
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the currently 75 office-based physicians plus the three local hospitals. While 
Solimed Enterprise Health has an executive management like any other 
company, the shareholders’ meeting is the basic decision-making body. In this 
respect, Solimed Enterprise Health has retained a grassroots-democracy which is 
also typical of a network. Once presented to the shareholders, the treatment 
pathways are, therefore, not imposed as a given, but open to discussion. Indeed, 
sometimes the entire group strongly opposes the draft of the working group:  
 
“I remember the treatment pathways for diabetes. The working group had 
selected such strict HB1C values, that are the long-term blood sugar 
values, and the Solimed group was … well … furious and said: ‘We will 
never reach these limit values, we  will cook us a goose if we take such 
strict limits – they can never be met with Average Joe and Jane!’ You see, 
the Solimed group does not wave through everything.” 
 
The shareholders’ meeting could be seen as a symbol of Solimed Enterprise 
Health: a cross-sectoral group of various office-based physicians and three 
hospitals, who are separate entities, but bound together by the rules and 
structures they develop by and for themselves. How they define their rules, 
where they set their limits, may have a critical impact on whether their actions 
can be considered a success. The software turnover required a one-time 
investment, but the monthly shareholders’ meetings require ongoing 
commitment. Pathways need to be developed, discussed, decided on and 
implemented – and this without any certainty of return on investment. Whether 
the Solimed members are financially rewarded for their internal efforts, depends 
on  their  external  connections.  To  study  how  this  works,  we  turn  towards  
Enterprise Health becoming active in the health care market where insurers play 
an important role.  
 
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION, COSTS AND QUALITY   
Over the past decades, corporatism has been the dominant mode of governance 
in the German health system (cf. also SVR, 2005). Particularly in the ambulatory 
sector, the Kassenärztliche Vereinigungen (KVs; regional associations of 
statutory health insurance physicians) had a relatively strong position: They were 
empowered to conclude collective contracts with the sickness funds on behalf of 
their members; mandatorily all office-based physicians treating patients with 
statutory health insurance (over 90% of all insured). These collective contracts 
were then applicable to all statutory health insurance physicians of a certain 
region. At the beginning of  the  20th century, collective contracts had been an 
achievement – an innovation in health care – because the single office-based 
physician could be protected against the unequally larger contracting capacities 
of a sickness fund. By the end of the 20th century, collective contracts concluded 
by KVs were increasingly denounced as monopolist arrangements, allegedly 
inhibiting greater efficiency. Several health policy reforms have tried to 
incentivize a paradigm shift from corporatist to more market-oriented structures. 
Notably, since 2000, office-based physicians are allowed to conclude integrated-
care contracts directly with sickness funds, and since 2004, these selective 
contracts have received financial incentives (Amelung et al, 2008). 
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Integrated care-contracts, as a novel form of selective contracting directly 
between sickness funds and an interdisciplinary or cross-sectoral set of 
providers, mushroomed: the number of contracts rose to over 6,000 by the end of 
2008 (Grothaus, 2009). For providers, these contracts raised the prospect of 
additional funds on top of their regular budgets, while sickness funds did not take 
financial risks, because they had been permitted to withhold 1% of the total 
payment for all office-based physicians as agreed in the collective contracts with 
KVs, in order to finance selective integrated care-contracts. But this seed 
financing ended in 2008. Afterwards, sickness funds had a genuine incentive to 
scrutinize whether integrated care-contracts did indeed bring value for money; 
whether all of them really added value to improving coordination and, 
ultimately, quality and efficiency of care. Solimed Enterprise Health engaged 
relatively late in negotiations with sickness funds; in 2007, when seed funding 
was already drawing to a close and a certain disillusionment about the magic 
pill-character of integrated care-contracts had arisen. How then did the Solimed 
physicians enter into negotiations with sickness funds? 
 
Interviewer: “Did you actually negotiate with the entire Solimed group 
with the sickness funds?” – Physician: “No, this requires trust first of all! 
To begin with, we built up the company. Then we developed a 
management model – I am Chief Executive Officer, but two of my 
colleagues count as well and we always decide unanimously. Then we 
sent off a negotiation delegation, who proposed a complete contractual 
offer to the sickness funds, a 100-page integrated care-contract that we 
had worked out”. – Interviewer: “Did you develop this contract only 
among the physicians?” – Physician: “A manager from Landshut advised 
us a lot. At least half of the contract was penned by him”.   
 
We see that the Solimed physician and Chief Executive Officer sees trust as a 
necessary prerequisite for negotiations with sickness funds. He frames this trust 
as a form of business professionalism: Solimed physicians first of all needed to 
elaborate strong internal structures, including a management model, before they 
could take external action. Moreover, they did not approach the sickness funds 
with empty hands, but with a fully developed contract proposal which they had 
prepared together with a professional manager. This manager had helped to build 
up a similar health enterprise near Landshut, in the region of Oberpfalz. One 
could, therefore, deduce that the negotiations of Solimed physicians were backed 
up by two learning processes: the physicians learned from experiences made in 
another geographical region, and they learned from the fields of management and 
business. A hospital manager involved in Solimed Enterprise Health confirms 
the need for linkage and learning between medicine and business: 
 
“I learned that physician networks function best if they are led by 
physicians, so that physicians are motivated to participate. But they still 
need the competence of business people, in order to be economic. As a 
hospital we can support this, we have always been negotiating directly 
with the sickness funds. The physicians are slowly growing into it. And 
that is why it’s such a great project, everyone contributes know-how in 
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the best interest of the issue. If you always ask ‘what´s in for me?’, then it 
doesn´t work. For me this is a long-term investment and not ‘do we have 
a return on investment after two years’. Peu à peu, we have to see what is 
developing with the big players, KV, and the sickness funds AOK and 
Barmer who represent here about 70-80% of all insurees: selective 
contracts! I want to stay on the ball with my hospital, of course. And this 
is much better when I´m already cross-linked in a network. When I can 
already offer a complete range of services.” 
 
The hospital manager develops a remarkable account of how Solimed Enterprise 
Health became active in the health care market. While the hospital manager 
learned to leave leadership to the physicians, the physicians learn from hospital 
managers about negotiation tactics with sickness funds. Thus, Solimed 
Enterprise Health became active in the health care market by, first of all, valuing 
mutual learning. A spirit of cooperation in the best interest of the issue supports 
this process. Engaging in negotiations with sickness funds simultaneously occurs 
in recognition of broader trends, notably the apparent trend towards selective 
contracts. The hospital manager emphasizes that in this context single-
mindedness can be short-sighted: Cross-sectoral cooperation may later prove to 
be an essential asset for negotiations with sickness funds – also for the single 
hospital – because cross-sectoral cooperation enables them to offer a continuum 
of services. 
So far, the cross-sectoral cooperation between hospitals and office-based 
physicians in Solimed Enterprise Health has led to integrated care-contracts with 
two large sickness funds: AOK Rheinland/Hamburg and Barmer. What motivates 
the managers of a sickness fund to conclude an integrated care-contract? A 
referee of AOK Rheinland/Hamburg explains: 
 
“The main reason for us was that we want to offer guidance for our 
patients to help them find their way in the complex health system, and to 
simplify the ways. Then, there is the over-, under- and misuse of health 
services, that is more the scientific reason. Optimizing health service 
quality, increasing efficiency – that made us conclude such a 
cooperation.”- Interviewer: “What is special about the contract with 
Solimed?” - Sickness fund referee: “For the first time we have concluded 
a contract with an enterprise, not directly with providers. Secondly, there 
is an electronic patient file which facilitates exchange of data. The third 
issue is the remuneration, we want to move from fee-for-service-payment 
to a budget, a capitation scheme.”  
 
The perspective of AOK Rheinland/Hamburg embraces, first of all, their prime 
mandate as a social health insurance body: to support their insured when in need 
of care, that is, to help them receive timely and appropriate care. This care needs 
to be of high quality and high efficiency, neither leading to overuse, underuse 
nor misuse of health services (cf. SVR, 2000/01). In this context, the AOK 
Rheinland/Hamburg views their contract with Solimed as an opportunity to fulfil 
their mandate. Solimed Enterprise Health is a company with – as we have seen – 
binding and specific internal rules of procedure, not a loose set of individual 
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providers. An electronic patient file and a budget model are two other elements 
of the contract. Before digging deeper into the budget model, let us take a closer 
look at the meaning of electronic integration in a health care market.  
To recall, all Solimed members are connected through their software 
systems in order to facilitate and speed up information exchange. But the idea of 
an electronic patient file is a delicate issue in Germany: legal barriers, privacy 
and patients’ rights, fears of misuse of confidential data stored somewhere on a 
central server, are held high. Sensing these concerns, Solimed members decided 
to leave patient data decentralized with the respective provider. Only if patients 
agree can their data be exchanged through the common software. For this 
purpose, AOK and Barmer insurees in Solingen can enrol cost-free in a personal 
health network. Afterwards, personal data do not circulate freely among Solimed 
members, but the patient defines who may or may not have insight into 
diagnoses, medication, findings. It is a market arrangement – the two sickness 
funds pay for the extra time that physicians invest into adjustment of medication, 
thus, only the AOK and Barmer insurees in Solingen can reap the benefits of 
improved communication with regard to medication and coherent treatment 
pathways. 
Another element, only of the contract with the AOK, is the shift from fee-
for-service to a budget model. The basic idea is capitation: to pay a lump sum per 
insured, not per service provided. Starting in 2010, Solimed will, thus, receive an 
annual budget to finance the entire range of services across sectors for each 
AOK-insuree enrolled in the personal health network. An AOK 
Rheinland/Hamburg referee explains the rationale for a budget model as follows: 
 
“In the German health system, the different sectors are paid out of 
different pools. Because of budgeting of the individual sectors, the 
provider has no interest in doing more than what he is paid. With the 
budget model you have the opportunity to calculate a lump sum for all 
services and reward when e.g. office-based physicians can avoid 
unnecessary hospital admissions.” 
 
In the view of the sickness fund, capitation can provide a market incentive for 
providers to render their treatment services more efficient. In a way, capitation is 
the response of insurers to the health system quest for coordination. Capitation 
means that a set of providers receives a fixed amount, thereby stimulating 
providers to avoid (unnecessary) costly interventions, and to coordinate among 
themselves who can provide the relevant service in the most efficient way. Per 
capita allocations are obviously attractive to insurers, as they facilitate long-term 
planning and may help insurers receive the best value for their money. For 
providers, however, capitation can be quite risky. Ultimately, capitation means 
that the insurance function – insurance for the risk of illness and the associated 
costs – is shifted from sickness fund to provider. With a given amount of money, 
the provider has to cover the morbidity risk of a given insured, that is, assume all 
treatment costs incurred over a year. Why should any provider accept this 
financial risk? What drives a provider to choose capitation? We listen to an 
office-based Solimed physician: 
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“I don´t like capitation for its own sake. Capitation is sensible only if you 
can represent the entire chain of care; outpatient and inpatient. If you do 
that, you have to agree with all people. And that is our aim. We have 
excellent medical quality in our practices, I don´t think we can improve 
much there. But the friction losses are enormous. If I tackle them, I want 
to have a share in the efficiency gains. The capitation model also has 
another advantage. We suffer from all this bureaucracy. I am not allowed 
any more to do gastroscopies, although I´m capable and have all good 
devices. A colleague trained as cardiologist can do marvellous cardiac 
ultrasound, but must not, because he is licensed as a general practitioner. 
And with a capitation model, we agree among ourselves by looking into 
each other´s eyes: `You make the best cardiac ultrasounds, you two can 
make the best gastrocopies, thus you do it .` That is how we achieve 
quality … and not with formalities. That would be our dream. For this I 
would … say … consider the capitation model.” 
 
From the view of the office-based physician, capitation seems to have two 
promises; but only under a certain condition: providers need to agree across 
sectors and across disciplines, that is, they need to control to a certain extent the 
services provided by others. The first promise of capitation is that providers can 
benefit from the quality and efficiency gains achieved through cross-sectoral care 
coordination. The physician sees friction losses in terms of communication and 
coordination deficits between providers as a main area for action. In Solingen, 
these friction losses are tackled through electronic integration, treatment 
pathways, and other forms of cross-sectoral agreements.4 These agreements are 
expected to improve both quality and efficiency of care. In principle, sickness 
funds are the primary beneficiaries of these improvements – due to immediate 
savings, or due to the improved health of their insured (and thereby lower health 
care costs in the future) that presumably result from adjusted medication, rapid 
availability of important patient details and provision of optimal care along 
standardized pathways. Capitation embodies the promise that the lump sum 
received is not exhausted due to efficient care provision, and that the efficiency 
gains can subsequently be shared with the sickness fund. The Solimed members 
hope  to  be  financially  rewarded for  their  efforts  and investments  by  the  end of  
2010 or 2011. 
Second, capitation promises to be a counter-proposal against hierarchical 
health system governance. The physician seems to perceive capitation as a means 
to escape from the bureaucracy and formalities imposed top-down from the 
health system onto a single practice. Providers agree among themselves who can 
provide the necessary service in the best way, both in terms of quality and 
efficiency. This logic exemplifies the double-edged-sword-character of many 
innovations: while capitation does imply a financial risk for providers, it also 
implies the opportunity of more freedom and self-governance. But apart from the 
potential complexities associated with calculating which financial amounts 
                                                   
4 Apart from treatment pathways defining which provider does what, when and how for a given 
disease, there are also positive lists on agreed pharmaceuticals. Hospitals and office-based physicians 
agree on the most cost-effective pharmaceuticals that are to be provided. 
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would be necessary to cover all costs for any given insured, enhanced self-
governance can also lead to a dilemma of two strong concepts: cooperation and 
competition.  
On the one hand, a capitation model requires cooperation in terms of 
adherence to common agreement in order to realize quality and efficiency gains. 
But on the other hand, there is the more or less explicit driver of competition: 
who provides the best care? This question is not relevant when an entire set of 
providers equally shares the overall lump sum received for a patient. But if only 
providers who actually provided care receive a share, a spirit of competition is 
self-evident. Largely depending on referrals from the ambulatory sector, 
hospitals may then be the ‘losers’ in this competitive process. Hospital treatment 
tends to be more costly because of the technology and infrastructure involved, 
and, as the AOK referee noted in his account above, avoidance of expensive 
hospital admissions is therefore an obvious strategy to generate cost-savings. 
Thus, why should a hospital be willing to participate in capitation? We listen to a 
manager of one of the hospitals participating in Solimed, and see that the 
meaning of capitation to a hospital is not necessarily what it seems: 
  
”We started very euphorically with such a capitation model. The more 
you engage in the topic, the more you realize its complexity. What does it 
mean for you? Of course, a hospital cannot be a stone quarry for a 
physician network: due to our volume we have of course quite a big 
financial budget. For us the question is whether we acquire new patients. 
Or whether we, I say this very consciously, are unburdened by patients 
who need our diagnostics for a short time, go home the next day and say 
‘well apparently it was rather some little malaise’. Huge costs for us, 
nothing gained … we are not adequately remunerated for such cases. But 
then, there could be a strategy to prevent such costs! Of course, this needs 
to develop peu à peu. Obviously it´s not the purpose that 20% of our 
budget wander to Solimed and we cannot cover our operating expenses 
anymore.”  
 
Operating in a health care market, in a health enterprise such as Solimed, the 
participating sectors face the challenge of balancing the spirits of cooperation 
and competition. While it seems, at first glance, that a hospital can only lose in a 
capitation model where savings are generated through reduced hospital 
admissions, this is not necessarily true. The current payment system of hospitals, 
based on diagnosis related groups (DRGs), is primarily based on diagnoses 
instead of actual services provided. However, the diagnosis may emerge only 
after expensive diagnostics have already been performed – to the detriment of the 
hospital, if the diagnosis turns out to be a minor malaise. Capitation would 
motivate office-based physicians to scrutinize more closely the necessity of 
hospital admissions and, thereby, also disburden a hospital of cases that dissipate 
those resources which are needed for genuinely sick patients. But what does 
this mean for patients? In the U.S., where capitation models had been introduced 
by managed care-organizations, providers were accused of withholding 
necessary treatment to their patients for financial reasons. As a result, the 
concept of “managed care” became increasingly discredited as “managed costs” 
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– even though managed care, as such, cannot be equated with capitation 
financing. Nevertheless, the members of Solimed Enterprise Health seem to be 
well aware of the dangers of bad publicity. An office-based physician elaborates 
on this concern, and the precautions that have been taken: 
 
“`We are good, we increase quality` - everyone can say that. But when 
you do a model where you profit from efficiency gains, this quickly raises 
suspicion that you save at the expense of patients. Therefore, we have 
quality indicators to confirm that we are better than normal treatment. If I 
prove this, nobody can accuse me. And I´m indeed concerned that 
someone accuses me ‘but you economize your patients to death’! Thus, I 
have to prove the quality”. – Interviewer: “How do you do this?” – 
Physician: “We use quality indicators such as hospital re-admission rates 
twelve months after a heart attack due to another acute coronary 
syndrome. This shows a) how good the hospitals performed the acute 
treatment, and b) covers pharmaceutical therapy in the ambulatory 
sector. The more rapid and coherent the treatment, the lower the rates of 
renewed infarction in the first year.”  
 
The Solimed members chose to prevent bad publicity by an explicit commitment 
to monitoring and evaluation. Along implementation of each treatment pathway, 
indication-specific quality indicators are introduced simultaneously. Notably, the 
indicators need to reflect performance of all the sectors involved: both hospital 
and ambulatory therapy. These quality indicators also seem to reflect the 
recognition that pure cost containment can only bring short-term benefits: As the 
physician illustrates, even after one year, hospital admission rates may be 
significantly higher if treatment of heart attacks was too slow or incoherent. 
 So far, we have explored different stakeholders involved in Solimed – 
insurers, hospitals, patients, and office-based physicians. However, one should 
not forget that not all physicians in Solingen participate in the Enterprise Health, 
be this out of financial, administrative or other reasons. What does this mean for 
the relationship to the physicians who did not join Solimed Enterprise Health? A 
physician reflects:  
 
“The others eye us suspiciously, because they are concerned that they are 
having the butter taken off their bread, that ultimately the insurers tell 
their insurees: ‘guys, if you enrol in Solimed, please take care that you 
consult only Solimed physicians’. Currently, this is not the case. But the 
other colleagues are concerned, of course, when such a strong group 
manifests. Personally, I maintain a good relationship to the colleagues 
who chose not to collaborate here, but you simply see each other less 
often.  Through this close cooperation in Solimed, you lose contact to the 
others. Such an enormous wave was kicked off in Solingen, and the others 
are swimming a bit beside.” 
 
The creation of Solimed Enterprise Health created certain boundaries between 
the physicians in Solingen: speaking of ‘exclusion’ would not be true, as Solimed 
Enterprise Health was and is in principle open to anyone willing to participate 
Markets, Networks and the Quest for Coordination 
   55 
and to invest in the joint software. Rather, there seem to be concerns regarding 
competition for patients, especially when insurers should, at sometime in the 
future, recommend their insured to consult Solimed physicians as the preferred 
providers. Moreover, Solimed medical quality network still co-exists with 
Solimed Enterprise Health, and the traditional ways of communication, such as 
the patient-accompanying-letter or use of fax, are still in place. But informal 
communication and cooperation – that create a sense of coherence among 
Enterprise Health members – become less frequent with other office-based 
physicians in Solingen. In this respect, the local innovation unites and divides at 
the same time. 
 
BEYOND THE ‘INVISIBLE HAND OF THE MARKET’  
This story has reconstructed the development of Solimed Enterprise Health, one 
of the few cases recognized as successful integration of care. I looked at early 
initiatives in the form of a medical quality network, explored the 
institutionalization of this interdisciplinary cooperation and its expansion to the 
cross-sectoral level, and followed Solimed Enterprise Health engaging in the 
health care market. Which lessons can we draw from this local case given the 
quest for coordination at health system level? 
A first lesson relates to the mix of governing modes for achieving care 
coordination. My story suggests that the success of Solimed Enterprise Health – 
reflected in the two innovation prizes – may have resulted from commitment to a 
mixed-mode of health care governance, rather than a single strategy. Along the 
process of integrating care, we have seen that Solimed incorporates trust- and 
partnership-based features typical of a network, but also hierarchical elements in 
the form of clear rules, and market-like modes of choice and competition. The 
notion of ‘hybrids’ is not new to organizational theory (Williamson 1996). How 
to achieve such a critical mix for integrated care is more intricate (Zelman 1996). 
This story has unfolded the stages in Solingen: winning the hearts and minds of 
clinicians was central, and only then did business management and hierarchies 
follow to facilitate clinical, functional and technological integration of care. 
A second lesson concerns the process of integrating care from the 
grassroots. Using new legislative opportunities, such as integrated care-
contracting with sickness funds, the Solimed physicians were apparently 
stimulated by respective health policy reforms. However, they were not simple 
implementers of health policy goals. The health policy quest for coordination in 
terms of improved quality and efficiency of care was certainly relevant. 
Nevertheless, the physicians attached their own local meaning to this abstract 
quest for coordination. Indeed, they had their own drivers for improving 
coordination: particular problems encountered at local level, and the momentum 
and we-spirit created by previous successes. This might seem irrational to a 
neoclassical economist who reduces human motivation to price signals. It proved 
to be essential for integrating care in Solingen. Interestingly, another driver was 
the effort to protect oneself against health policy developments looming large as 
threats for the single provider: such as the introduction of medical treatment 
centres/ MVZs, increasing bureaucracy, and the trend towards selective 
contracting  where  single  providers  felt  the  need  to  stay  on  the  ball  in  order  to  
assert themselves in the market. 
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In addition to these two lessons to be drawn immediately from the local 
case, let us consider a system-wide perspective. Solimed Enterprise Health is but 
one new player in an emerging playing field of selective contracting for 
enhanced coordination; across Germany, several more or less similar players 
have been emerging in a more or less successful way. Examples similar to 
Solimed are the physician-led and cross-sectoral health enterprises in the regions 
of Oberpfalz, Kinzigtal or Bünde (Weatherly et al, 2007). In total, thousands of 
integrated care-contracts have been concluded since 2004 (Grothaus, 2009). Few 
are as elaborate as Solimed when considering the dimensions of electronic, 
medical and functional integration, but still, there is a range of structural options 
as to how care can best be integrated – with differing impacts on the scope for 
coordination. Moreover, while the concept of “integrated care” tends to be 
associated with a particular paragraph of the Social Code Book V (§140), which 
enables the so-called ‘integrated care-contracts’, there are many other novel 
forms of integrating and coordinating care (Steffen & Waning, 2008). The rising 
number of medical treatment centres operating in the ambulatory sector with 
salaried physicians, often led by large hospital chains, is likewise an attempt to 
respond to the quest for coordination, as are the contractual opportunities for 
general practitioner (associations) for strengthening primary-care-centred 
coordination.  
While new players for selective contracts emerge, the traditional player 
for collective contracts has to sit on the sidelines – the KV is explicitly excluded 
from integrated care-contracting. What does that mean for a health system, if a 
traditional strong and large player is weakened and various new and small 
players arise? There cannot be a single-sentence answer to this question. 
Enlarging the view, we listen to a KV representative. 
 
“Currently there is a co-existence, if not a contra-existence, of collective 
contract and all these selective contract models. We as KV don´t know the 
content of these contracts, but still, we have the responsibility for 
guaranteeing provision of services. But the resources are finite, and the 
sickness funds clear the total compensation package for ambulatory 
services by the claims that are made by the selective contract partners. 
Thus it becomes more difficult for us to guarantee the provision of 
services. Also in view of the fact that politicians still approach us, if 
somewhere in the Eifel [a rural region in Northrhine Westphalia] there is 
a physician shortage. Politicians do not approach the sickness funds or 
the physician network XY, they approach us to complain: ‘You must close 
this service provision gap’. 
 
Interviewer: “So how can there be better coordination between sectors, if 
not with selective integrated care contracts?” 
 
KV representative: “Well, I don’t have the perfect solution … It is not 
about forced merger of the sectors, or heroic battles to tear down the 
walls between them, it is about finding intelligent solutions how to make 
sectors permeable. This does not mean that one player has to do 
everything; this may result in regional treatment monopolies. (…) With 
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ageing of society, providers gradually achieve a better position due to 
scarcity of supply. But sickness funds and politics haven´t fully grasped 
that yet. Promoting competition through selective contracts partly rests 
on the illusion that, thereby, prices will fall. There will indeed be 
competition on prices, I believe, but in the opposite direction! Because the 
health market is gradually developing from a purchaser market to a 
supplier market. In attractive areas of high population density, like 
Hamburg or Freiburg, there certainly is an unnecessary oversupply 
which could be removed by a very competitive relationship between 
physicians and sickness funds. But sometime the relation would turn 
upside down, and insurers who would need to pay any price. Imagine, if 
Solimed finally succeeded to line up all local providers, then no sickness 
fund could get around Solimed.” 
 
Interviewer: “And no sickness fund could get around the KV?”  
KV representative: “The question is whether politics could get around the 
KV. Health policymakers cannot face how sickness funds must buy 
services at a price they cannot afford. The responsibility to guarantee 
services – the raison d`être of the KV – is that unequal distribution of 
services produced by the market through competition is socially not 
desirable. Already today, all these innovations, they concentrate service 
supply where we already have a high density of supply, where insurers 
expect a marketing effect. (…) Competition does not necessarily lead to a 
balanced distribution of services, but rather sharpens existing disparities 
between highly populated and rural areas. 
 
Interviewer: “How could you change this?”  
 
KV representative: “Well, first of all politics needs to clarify the position 
of the KV. Currently there is this ambiguity ‘for the limelight we have 
these innovative forms of care, but for remaining duties we somehow need 
the KV’. We need something like clear market regulations. The KV could 
be a market regulator, or immediately engage in contracting, or assume 
management and service functions … There could be many options, also 
hybrids. But the main issue is a transparent regulative framework with 
clear competences.” 
 
While there seems to be a paradigmatic shift from corporatist to market 
governance, the health system quest for coordination has not been resolved. 
Indeed, as the account of the KV representative illustrates, allegedly innovative 
market structures may create new dilemmas as they solve old ones. Coordination 
is a multi-dimensional concept: the Advisory Council on the Assessement of 
Developments in the Health System, instituted by the Federal Ministry of Health, 
draws attention to the need for coordination not only between disciplines and 
between sectors  –  as  we explored  via  the  story  of  Solimed Enterprise Health – 
but also between generations, and between regions (SVR 2009). Consideration of 
the health needs of different generations along the life cycle – children, 
adolescents, working and elderly people and respective transitions – will likely 
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impact on the success or failure of coordination mechanisms, such as cross-
sectoral treatment pathways, to achieve integrated care.  
Coordination of care across regions is a particularly challenging task. In a 
market-driven healthcare system, providers and insurers may have the incentive 
to cream-skim urban regions with sufficient insurees. However, to ensure 
universal equal access to health services – highly valued in the German social 
solidarity system – someone needs to guarantee care provision also for remote, 
scarcely populated regions that are less attractive to investors. Recent research 
highlights puzzling regional differences in the quality of care in Germany; part of 
which may be related to unequal capacity for coordination between ambulatory, 
hospital and continuing care (Bertelsmann Stiftung/IGES 2011). Solimed was 
named not only after its geographic origin, the city of Solingen,  but  also  to  
emphasize the value of solidarity between disciplines and sectors. The local case 
revealed critical struggles and successes of this process. Now health policy will 
have to take on the challenge to ensure solidarity in access to care across regions.  
Although ‘the market’ is often too easily accepted as the most efficient, 
and therefore the most appropriate, governing mode in health care, the account of 
the KV representative highlights that pure market-governance can lead to 
undesired distortions, for example between regions. Certainly, a purely 
corporatist model or network-based governance may not be perfect either. 
Nevertheless, a regulatory framework establishing clear rights and roles of the 
traditional, and of the emerging health care players, seems necessary.  
The local case of Solimed Enterprise Health illustrates that it was not 
(only) Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand of the market’ which enabled integration of 
care. It was rather the visible work of real people who were – and still are – 
struggling, but succeeding, in mixing various modes of governance to integrate 
care. At health system level the quest for coordination will most likely not be 
answered through a single mode of governance, either. The story of Solimed 
rather confirms the proposition that “it is the mix that matters” (Rhodes, 1997: 
p.34). With a new Health Care Structure Act (Versorgungsstrukturgesetz) under 
scrutiny in Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011), debate has been re-ignited 
on the appropriate policy measures to coordinate health care services and supply 
based on population need. Finding the right mix of governance modes for 
coordinating care across disciplines, sectors, and regions will remain a major 
challenge for the coming years. 
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